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Summary  findings
Paternostro  and Sahn  analyze  wage  determination  and  specialization  of specific  regions  translated  into
gender  discrimination  in Romania  using  the  1994  differences  in regional  performance  and hence  local
Romanian  Household  Survey.  They  estimate  wages  for  economic  differences.
men  and women  in urban  and  rural  areas  using  a  They  found  discrimination  against  women  in both
Heckman  selection  model.  They  analyze  gender  urban  and  rural  labor  markets,  especially  at low  levels of
discrimination  in offered  wages,  to address  the  education.  The  observed  bias  against  women  in urban
methodological  shortcomings  found  in the literature.  areas  is comparable  to that  found  in other  Western
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rural  than  in urban  areas,  especially  for  women.  difficulties  in the  region,  women's  relative  wages  may be
Labor  markets  are segmented  regionally,  probably  as a  expected  to decline  further.
result  of the  country's  economic  history,  especially  the  Discrepancy  in pay also directly  affects the  level of
spatial  allocation  of resources  under  a centrally  planned  pensions,  unemployment  benefits,  and  other  means-
economy.  Only  with  economic  liberalization  has the  tested  benefits  to workers,  contributing  to pauperization.
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Siince  the end of the 1980s  Eastern  Europe and the former Soviet Union have been
experiencing  a fundamental  restructuring  of their economic  system toward a market economy.
In this new phase, one of the many  challenges  faced by policy makers  is to formulate  adequate
labor market policies  and design suitable  safety nets. In an attempt to provide some insight
into the functioning  of the Romanian  labor market, this paper focuses on the understanding  of
wage determination  in general and the extent  of gender  discrimination  in specific.
Discerning  the differences  in wages  that stem from endowments  such as education,
experience  and demographic  characteristics  is in fact critical in assessing  the likely outcomes  of
the ongoing  process of economic  adjustment  in the labor markets. Prior to the current reform
period, wages  as well as the allocation  of labor were heavily regulated  in Romania. Wage
differentials  by skill level were small and compensation  by enterprises  was primarily
determined  by the government: remuneration  was centrally  determined  for all categories  of
employees. Output per unit of time was also decided  by the state for those  workers whose
performance  was measurable. Central authorities  determined  the internal wage structure  of the
individual  enterprise  thus depriving  the local management  of any flexibility  regarding  wages to
suitably attract labor if needed. Furthermore, local management  had very limited  power in
firing workers while central  planners controlled  labor mobility  both across sectors and regions
(IMF, 1991).
It is only in 1991 that, within a broad based reform package, the government  began to
liberalize  the labor market by allowing  wage scales and hiring and promotion  criteria to be
determined  by collective  contracts  between workers and managers  that are renewed annually.
3Such contracts however  are subject  to the national  income policy  which sets minimum  and
maximum  wages  for different categories  of workers  (World Bank, 1992).
The determination  of wages  has obvious  repercussions  on the whole economy. Thus,
in this paper, we investigate  the determinants  of wages as of 1994  by using the first
comprehensive  household  survey ever administered  in the country since the beginning  of
Romania's transition to a market economy. We implicitly  apply a neoclassical  framework  to
wage formation and test a variety of hypotheses  concerning  the returns to higher education  and
experience, the presence  of regional market segmentation,  as well as gender and ethnic
discrimination.  As a whole, labor markets in Romania  have received hardly any attention  by
researchers  and little is known even about their basic features.  Earle and Pauna (1996)  and
Kallai and Traistaru (1998) represent  two noticeable  exceptions  providing  valuable analysis  of
labor markets  in the country since  the transition.  Earle and Pauna investigate  the incidence  and
duration of unemployment  and show, among  others, the prevalence  of unemployment  among
women with a rate that is nearly double  of what found in other transition  countries. Kallai and
Traistaru concentrate  on regional  labor market trends in Romania  during 1990-1995.  Regional
disparities  are found to be of considerable  relevance  and, similar to the Polish experience,  they
have remained  rather stable throughout  the period. Moreover they find a lack of responsiveness
to labor market pressures  in the evolution  of regional  average  real wages.
Although several studies  have focused  on the relevance  of the gender  wage gap in
developed  as well as developing  countries', this phenomenon  is not very well documented  in
l See among others: Knight  and Sabot (1982); Blau and Kahn (1992); Psacharopulos  and Tzannatos  (1992);
Appleton  et al (1999).
4Eastem Europe  and particularly  in Romania. The available  evidence  indicates that gender wage
differentials  before the transition  in Central and Eastern Europe were on average  similar to
those  in Western Europe and non-English  speaking  countries  in general 2 (Fong and Paul, 1992,
Atkinson  1992) but significantly  better than in countries  such as Australia, Canada, the UK and
the US (Atkinson  1992). Orazem and Vodopivec,  (1995 and 1998)  while confirming  the above
trend for Estonia find, however, that relative female  wages  in Slovenia  were considerably
higher than in market economies. 3 More interestingly  their study represents  perhaps the only
significant  exception  to the lack of formal analysis  on gender  wage differentials  in Central and
Eastern Europe  after the transition. 4 Their data set in fact enables  them to study the two
countries  up to 1994  and 1992  respectively;  they can thus show that in terms of relative
wages, 5 women actually gained  from the transition
2  For Yugoslavia however  female relative wages were higher than in all other European countries. Note that
relative wages do not capture properly the possible presence of discrimination as they do not distinguish it from
productivity differences that may be present.
3  As  of 1987 female wages were 88 percent of wages for men in Slovenia and 64 percent in Estonia as of  1989.
' Rutkowski (1996) provides some statistical evidence on the evolution of earnings differentials in some transition
countries:  The reported  female/male ratios are .74 for Bulgaria in 1993,  .61 in the Czech Republic in 1992,  .84 in
Hungary  iLn 1992, .79 in Poland in 1993 and .88 in Slovenia in 1992
5 More specifically, the increase was to 0.90 in Slovenia and 0.74 inEstonia.  This is a consequence of increased
labor demand for the more educated in the work force (and that women have on average a higher level of human
capital than men in the two countries). The authors however consider such evolution as a transitory one. Women
are less mobile and men are gaining an increasing share of the new positions in the expanding sectors thus eroding
the early 2relative  gains that accrued to women.
5In this paper we build upon previous  analysis  of labor markets  in Eastern Europe,
concentrating  on the specific  issue of gender-related  wage discrimination,  and in doing so,
addressing  the observed  effect of productivity  differences  between women and men on average
wage differentials.  The identification,  and subsequent  efforts to eradicate  wage discrimination
between men and women is not  just a socially  desirable  goal but has direct effects on efficiency
and growth.  As shown by Becker (1975), if male and female  labor are assumed  to be perfect
substitutes,  then economy-wide  discriminatory  behavior  against  women will generate not only
a gain for men  at the expense of women, but will also reduce firms' profits and therefore
investments  and growth.  Moreover, such discrepancy  in pay has a direct effect on the level of
pensions, unemployment  benefits and other means  tested benefits paid to workers, contributing
to a process of pauperization  that, in general, has been severe for women  in many Eastern
European  countries  since the outset of economic  liberalization 6. Such issues are particularly
relevant in Romania since women represent  the majority of both the population  and the labor
force. Despite the Romanian  labor code stipulates  equal pay for equal work, little is known  on
the exact characteristics  of pay levels in order to make a clear assessment  of discrimination  and
its economic  and social consequences.  (Fong 1996).
Our analysis  follows recently  established  econometric  techniques  as we estimate a
Heckman selection  model with maximum  likelihood  techniques. In addition, we are
particularly  interested  in issues of gender  discrimination  in transition economies. In addressing
this question, we also find that there is still a certain  amount of confusion  over the proper
implementation  of the procedures  for the estimation  of wage  discrimination.  Consequently,
6 For a discussion on this point see Heinen (1994).
6we highlight  shortcomings  in previous  research and offer a correct interpretation  of the
methods  in question.
The paper is organized  as follows: Section  II discusses  the data used in the analysis  and
the main features of the sample; Section  III describes  the methodology  employed  and reviews
the literature  on similar issues; Section  IV presents  the results obtained; and, Section V draws
the conclusions  and presents some  possible  avenues  for future research.
II.  THE DATA
The data set used is the 1994  Romania  Integrated  Household  Survey (Government  of
Romania, 1994) conducted  between April 1994  and December 1994. The investigation  was
conducted  on a household  sample  of 24,560 households  randomly selected  from all districts  of
Romania  and the city of Bucharest. The survey  collected  detailed information  on household
incomes and expenditures,  labor market activity, public transfers  and a wide range of living
standard  indicators. Since our study focuses on wage labor, we have excluded household
employment  as well as self-employment  activities,  both in agriculture and non-agriculture.
Moreover, because we anticipate  differences  by sector as well as gender, separate  models are
estimated  for men and women  for both rural and urban areas. 7
In analyzing  wage  labor markets we confine our investigation  to individuals  between
the age of 15 and 65 who are not in school. After deleting  observations  with missing  values,
we are left with a sample  of 21,297 observations  for urban areas (of which 51.63% females)
7 Nevertheless,  we do test our assumption  and the results  obtained  confirm  its validity. For test results see
footnote  13.
7and 20,518 in rural areas (of which  48.99% females). Table 1 reports means and standard
deviations  of the sample. It is worth noting that while female  wage workers in urban areas
constitute  46.2% of the total sample, their share drops to 28.4% in rural areas.  Moreover, the
relatively high averages, and low standard  deviations,  in the number of hours worked are a
clear indication  of a very limited amount  of part-time  workers regardless  of gender or location.
With respect to wages, the observed  log differential  of gross hourly wages between men
and women is 0.22 in urban areas and 0.16 in rural ones.  In other words, women are paid on
average 80% and 85% of what men receive  in urban and rural settings  respectively. Such
relative wages  are higher than Western European  or US equivalents: for example  the ratio in
Austria and Norway is 73%, while  in Germany  and United States 68%  . With respect to
Eastern Europe, Orazem and Vodopivec  (1995)  in their study of labor markets in Slovenia
find, a ratio of 90% in 1991.
As in many other Eastern European  countries, the schooling  rate is quite high. For
each sub-sample  at least 98% of the individuals  have received some  form of education, rural
females  with a 95.4% rate present the only exception. Also, within each sector, the
distribution  of individuals  over the different  educational  levels shows a predominance  of
females  with lower levels of education,  particularly  in rural areas.  Lastly, with regard to the
ethnic composition  of the population,  Romanians  account  for about 91 % of the total while
Hungarians  are the largest ethnic minority  at 7%.  Gypsies, who are under-represented,
comprise  only 1.  1% of the sample.
8 Blau  and  Kahn  (1992).
8III.  METHODOLOGY
We estimate wage equations  for men and women,  in urban and rural areas.  Since labor
market participation  is not likely to be random, concerns  arise over possible sample  selection
biases in the estimation  of the wage  function. To account  for this potential  problem, we
estimate  an Heckman  Selection  Model with maximum  likelihood  techniques.
Formally, let the wage function  take the usual  Mincerian  form:
(1) In(W) =  pXi  +  ei
wherelnWi  is the natural logarithm  of the observed  wage for individual  i, Xi is a vector of
observed characteristics,  8 is a vector of coefficients  and ei is a stochastic  error distributed
N(O, c9J.  Individual X  is included  among wage  workers if:
(2) y  Zi+ui>o
where Zi is a vector of observed  individual  characteristics,  y is a vector of coefficients  and u is
a stochastic  error distributed  N(O,1) that has covariance  p with the error term e, in the wage
equation (1).  Mills' ratio estimates  are used as starting  values for the maximum  likelihood
estimation. Let F  be the cumulative  probability  function  for the Normal distribution. The
log-likelihood  for observationj is then:
(3) Ij =l  n F  I  +()P  _(jJj)
if Wj  is observed  and ln(F(-I,))  if Wj  is not observed, where Ij = Zjy  from the probit
participation  equation  (2) and  J  = Xj,B  from the wage equation  (1).
Next, we proceed to decompose  the wage  differential  between men and women  in rural
and urban areas.  Our technique  is based on methods  originally  developed  by Oaxaca (1973)
9and Blinder (1973)  and subsequently  refined by Newmark  (1988) and Oaxaca  and Ransom
(1994). Following  Oaxaca  and Ransom  (1994)  define the observed  wage differentialGmf  as:
(4) Gf  = Wm/  Wf -
where Wf represents female  wages  and W.  male wages. In the absence of discrimination,  the
wage differential  between the two groups  will reflect pure productivity  differences  Qmf  defined
as:
(5) Qmf  =  W.. /Wof-  1,
where the 'o'  subscript  denotes  wages  that would  prevail in the absence of market
discrimination. The market discrimination  Df  is then defined as the difference, or residual,
between the observed  wage differential Gmf  +1 and the portion of it explained  by productivity
differencesQ,4  +1  . In logarithmic  form this can be expressed  as:
(6) ln(Gmf  +  1) =  ln(Dmf  +  1) +  ln(Qmf  +  1).
The discrimination  component 9 can be further decomposed  into female  underpayment  and male
overpayment. Thus, we can specify  a decomposition  equation  as follows:
(7) ln(Gmf  +  1)  = ln(dof  +  1)  + ln(dmo  + 1)  +  ln(Qmf  + 1)
where dof =  Wof  / Wf  - I and dro = Wm  I Wom. - 1 
As shown by Oaxaca  and Ransom (1994), within the context of semi-logarithmic  wage
equations  estimated  by ordinary least squares (OLS) from cross-section  data, (7) can be
reformulated  as:
9  It should be clear that the term discrimination  is used here to identify what is actually  a residual  component  that
may actually  be generated  by other unobserved  factors.  Such a generalization,  which  is common  to the literature,
should be kept in mind  when assessing  the significance  of the results  reported.
10(8) In  (G,m  +  1) = In  (Wm W>f)  =  X.  (p5 -X*)  +  X (p  P  *-f+  (f  -X  ),p*X
where W denotes  the geometric  mean wage for the respective  group, Xm  and Xf are the
vectors of mean values of the male and female  regressors,  f3m and pf  are the vectors of
estimated  coefficients  and ,B  *  is the estimated  nondiscriminatory  wage structure. Note that
each term in equation  (8) is the estimated  value of the correspondent  term of equation (7), i.e.,
the male advantage, the female  disadvantage  and the productivity  differential.
In this context then, the issue is how to determine  the wage structure , * that would
prevail in the absence of discrimination. Such choice  poses a well-known  index number
problem given that we could, for example, use both the male or female wage structure  as the
non-discriminatory  benchmark. While a priori there is no preferable alternative, the
decomposition  can be quite sensitive  to the selection  made.
If we let:
(9) 1*=Qlm+(  )
where S2  is a weighting  matrix and I is the identity  matrix, then any assumption  regarding  ,B*
can be seen as an assumption  regarding  LI.
The literature has proposed  different weighting  schemes  to deal with the underling
index problem:  first Oaxaca (1973)  proposes either the current male wage structure, i.e.,
Q =1, or the current female  wage structure, i.e., El  =0 -the null matrix-, as , *,  suggesting  that
the result would  bracket the "true" nondiscriminatory  wage structure. Reimers (1983)
implements  a methodology  that is equivalent  to Q = 0.5.  In other words identical  weights  are
assigned  to both men and women. Cotton (1988)  argues that the nondiscriminatory  structure
should approach  the structure  that holds for the larger group. In the context of sex
11discrimination  such weighting  structure  implies an Q =  iLi, where Im is the fraction  of males in
the sample.
A more generalized  method  is provided by Newmark  (1988), who shows that under
certain conditions  in the underlying  utility function 10 the correct non-discriminatory  wage
structure j3  * can be obtained  by OLS  estimates  on the pooled sample  where the model  adopted
is as in equation (1) i.e., without selection  bias correction. As shown by Oaxaca and Ransom
(1994), such result is equivalent  to a weighting  scheme  of the form:
(10)  W = (X'X)  X(,Xm)
whereX.  is the observation  matrix for the pooled sample  and X.,,  is the observation  matrix for
the male sample. Such a weighting  scheme  is not constrained  to produce results that are in
general a convex, linear combination  of the independently  estimated  male and female  wage
structures  (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994)."
Once these results are extended  to a Heckman  estimation  procedure of offered wages,
as we have done in this paper, the decomposition  methodology  should  be carefully tailored to
the new estimation  setting. Recall that BXi  from equation  (1) is an unbiased  estimate of the
wage W that an individual  with characteristics  Xi in the population  can earn on average
(Killingsworth,  1983). Thus, despite  the fact that the estimation  of (1) is implemented  on
observations  of workers only, we obtain  estimates  of offered  wages for the entire population.
'0 Specifically the firm's  utility function is homogeneous of degree zero within each type of labor (e.g.  skilled and
unskilled, or blue-collar and white collar).
i  Note that this is not true for the Cotton scheme, which is indeed a convex linear combination of the two
separate estimates.
12In this environment  then, we believe that the natural decomposition  to be performed is over the
wage  differential  in offered  wages for the entire sample. Accordingly,  to compute  ,B*  we apply
the weighting  scheme  as in (10) using the observation  matrix X and Xm  for the entire sample
and all the males respectively.  Similarly,  the decomposition,  as in (8), is performed by taking
sample means over the entire sample  of males and females. Note further that such a procedure
is equivalent  to computing 13*  by running  an OLS regression  on imputed  wages, W, for the
pooled saimple.
Other authors, having  adopted the Heckman  model  for wage estimation,  take a different
route in analyzing  wage  discrimination.  For example  Reimers (1983), in estimating  wage
discrimination  against  Hispanic and African-American  men, decomposes  offered wages  only
for people with characteristics  equivalent  to that of the average  worker. In the same fashion,
Appleton  et al. (1999)  follow the Reimers approach  and analyze  discrimination  between men
and women in several  African countries  computing 13*  as in (10) using the observations  of
workers only, despite the availability  of population  estimates.
Yet a different  approach  is taken by Glick and Sahn (1997) where 0* is computed
running  a Heckman  model on the pooled sample  of males and females. Consider  however  that
this methodology  implicitly  assumes that the participation  decision is the same for men and
women,  i.e.,  from equation  (2) ym=yf.  While this is a theoretically  admissible  case we believe
it is not empirically  relevant, given that, to our knowledge,  men and women have never been
assumed  or found to have the same  participation  model. Therefore, unless such an assumption
is true, incorrect Mill's Ratios will be used in estimation  procedure.
13As in Glick and Sahn (1997) we decompose the productivity difference (Xf  - Xm)J, * as
in equation (8) into its sub-components:  education,  experience,  etc.  Moreover, we extend  the
same exercise  to the male advantage X.( m - *)  and female  disadvantage  Xt (p * -pf)  terms,
thus enabling  us to better appreciate  the specific  relevance  of each set of variables  in the
determination  of the wage differential.
IV. FINDINGS
Wage equations
We discuss  first the wage equation  results as reported in Table 2.12  Wald tests results
confirm our assumption  of differing  wage structures  between urban and rural areas both for
women and men, the equality  of wage determinants  is rejected at the .001 level in both cases." 3
12 The results obtained  from the respective  probit participation  equations  are available  from the authors. The
estimated  probit coefficients  seem  reasonable. Age, education  and land holdings  are consistently  significant  in
determining  the probability  of wage labor  market  participation  across  all the four sets  of estimations. Also as
expected  the number  of children  is particularly  relevant for women's  participation. Other then the above variables
the regressions  were performed  including  non earned  income, demographic  characteristics,  marital status,
ethnicity, and regional  and monthly  variables. The principal exclusion  restrictions  used in the joint maximization
are experience  and the household  demographic  variables.
13 The general form of the test statistic  used is (B  - B)  (V. +V.)  (B  -Bj  ), where  ,i  and Pj  are the
parameters  for the two sectors  and V,  and V,  are their corresponding  variance  submatrices. Such a statistic  is
distributed  as a chi-square  (j) under the null, where  j is the number  of restrictions. This test assumes
cov (B, -B 1) =0 but does not impose  equality  of the variances  of the disturbances  for the two groups as a Chow
14Overall our regressions  seem well specified  and yield plausible  estimates.  The effect  of
education  variables  is positive  and significant  in all four models. Average returns rise
consistently  with education  relative to those with primary or less education  for all four
estimates. Table 3 reports the marginal returns to education." 4 University  degree holders in
urban areas have the highest marginal  return; moreover, other than that group, rural areas
display  higher marginal returns than urban ones. It is also interesting  to note that females
almost systematically  outperform  males in both sectors  and particularly  in rural settings.
Since we have introduced  age dummies  mainly to control for possible cohort effects, we
examine next the coefficients  associated  with the experience  variables. Consistent  with our
results on education, the coefficients  are highly significant  and suggest  a substantial  increase  of
offered wages with (potential)  experience. However  this is true only.  up to about 20 and 27
years of experience for men in urban and rural areas, respectively, and about 23 years for
females  in both settings; after that returns begin to decline.
Other than for rural women,  a small, statistically  significant  premium  is attached to
being married, with married men receiving  a higher return then women. This result is
contrary to the findings  in other Eastern European  countries  where wages (and participation
rates) are lower for married  women.  15
test would do (Glick and Sahn, 1997).  The value for the test statistic for males is 55.7 and for females is 45.0,
and the degrees of freedom are 22.
14 Given the semilogarithmic functional form of the wage equation we have computed such returns as
exp(c)-l,  where c is the untransformed marginal return of an education level. See Halvorsen and Palmquist,  1980.
See Heinen (1994).  Also, note that in our probit equations, the married variable  for both males and females in
urban areas and males in rural areas are positive and significant with the male dummies displaying higher
15Ethnic dummies  allow us to investigate  possible  discrimination  along such lines. Note
first that the ethnic dummies  are significant  only for males. Hungarians,  by far the biggest
ethnic minority represented  in the sample," 6 are found to have lower wages  in rural and urban
areas.17  The other ethnic groups appear  to be treated differently  in rural areas, where the sign
of the coefficient  is positive, than in urban ones where as expected  the coefficient  is negatively
signed. Despite the fact that the result at first may seem  counterintuitive,  note that such a
variable is a composite  of all the other ethnic  groups, including  Germans, present in Romania
(about 2.2% of the sample  for males). Moreover Gypsies, the other group we would expect to
be discriminated  against, account  for roughly  45 % of such residual ethnic groups in the total
sample, but drop to 29% and 18% in urban and rural areas, respectively,  when only wage
workers are accounted  for.  These results, along with our results from the probit equations," 8
suggest  a negative effect of ethnicity  for such groups mostly  in terms of job access rather then
wage offers.
With respect to the land variables, the ploughland  variables are negative and statistically
significant  for males both in rural and urban areas.  This corresponds  to the theory of
coefficients.  In light of the concern over the endogeneity of this variable, we tested its exclusion and found that it
does not have a large effect on the other parameters.
16  As indicated earlier, the Gypsy population is likely under-represented in the survey owing to their transient
lifestyle.
17  The difficult relations with ethnic Hungarians and with Hungary itself, which has generated inter-ethnic
tensions as recently as 1990, may help explain our fndings.
'8  The coefficient for rural males of such ethnic variable is equal to -.5744; with a standard error of  .099 and a
significance level of 1  .
16employers  paying  a premium to the permanently  available  laborer without  land because of
lower recruitment  costs (Bardhan, 1979). The positive sign on pasture land, may  be explained
by the low labor inputs for owners of this type of land, coupled  with the higher reservation
wage and wage offers, to landholders  (Dasgupta  and Ray, 1986).'9 The remaining  variables
included  in the regressions  are regional dummies,  intended  to capture the effects of local labor
markets on wages. 20 Other than for rural females, such regional  dummies  are overall
statistically  significant  suggesting  that labor market conditions  do generate wage differentials
among individuals  with equal human  capital  endowments.
Wage Discrimination
We turn next to the comparisons  of male and female wage offers in the two sectors.
Our decomposition  results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. For comparative  purposes we also
present the decomposition  results obtained  with weighting  schemes  other than the one
presented  in equation (10).
19  The inclusion of the land variables in the urban equations is justified by the fact that there are on average 7 % of
wage workers with positive land holdings in urban areas.
20 The inclusion of regional dummy variables is often criticized on grounds of endogeneity. Such criticism is
justified only if one is willing to assume a rather high level of labor mobility. We have opted for the inclusion of
these variables because in the case of Romania, as well as in many other Eastern European countries we believe
that such an assumption on labor mobility is quite unrealistic given that labor market segmentation at the
geographic level is a widespread phenomenon (OECD,  1995). For Romania in particular,  see Kallai and Traistaru
(1998)
17Our results indicate a total log wage differential of .244 in urban areas and of .598 in
rural ones; this in turn implies that the average hourly wage for males is 27% higher than that
of females in urban areas and 82 % higher in rural areas. Thus while in urban areas the wage
differential is comparable to that of Poland and, in general, places Romania among the
countries with a high female/male wage ratio, in rural areas the difference in wages is
considerably higher than in any other country for which figures are available. 21 While the
observed log wage differential, as discussed in Section II, is almost equal to the offered one for
urban areas, in rural settings the difference between the two is substantial.  Such divergence is
due to the fact that, only for rural females, observed and offered wages differ, as can be
inferred from the significance p as reported in Table 2.
As discussed in the previous section we have analyzed wage offers for the entire
sample. If one were to replicate the technique implemented by Reimers (1983) and, et al.
(1999)(i.e. computing the difference for workers only), the offered log wage differential would
be of  .216 and .405 in urban and rural areas respectively, thus underestimating the overall
offered wage differential of the population.
Relative to the relationship between the different weighting schemes, our results
confirm those of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).  Consider first the results for urban areas
presented in Table 4.  The Q2  as in equation (10) produces discrimination estimates that are
below those generated by the other alternative schemes, 22 and conversely higher values for the
21  Note that the heterogeneity  of data sets and time  periods makes such cross-country  comparisons  only
indicative.
22 We do not report the results  obtained  with  the Reimers  scheme.  The male and female  samples are of almost
identical  size; therefore  Reimers  estimates  and Cotton  ones are practically  identical.  Furthermore  note that as
18productivity  differential. Nevertheless,  the portion accounted  for by the different
characteristics  between  men and women  is quite small: 9.6%.  In addition, the discrimination
component  is almost  equivalently  subdivided  between  the male advantage  and the female
disadvantage. With respect  to rural areas the chosen weighting  scheme  produces
discrimination  estimates  that are lower then those generated  by the Cotton  scheme or by the
male weight,  but higher then the female  weighting  scheme. In this case the percentage  of the
gap explained  by differences  in productivity  is sensibly  higher, accounting  for 20.9%.  Still,
the male advantage  and female  disadvantage  components  of the discrimination  portion of the
gap are almost equivalent.
We further decompose  each term of equation  (8) into its main sub-components  to gain
further insight  into the determinants  of the wage differential.  Results are presented  below for
each decomposition  scheme  in Tables  4 and 5.  We limit our discussion  only to the weighting
scheme  in equation  (10).  Furthermore, we concentrate  on the most relevant  variables:
education  and experience. Both in rural and urban areas, differences  in educational  profiles
are by far the principal determinants  of the explained  portion of the wage gap.  With respect to
the decomposition  of the male advantage  and female  disadvantage  care must be taken in
interpreting  the results. Looking first at the results for rural areas, the contribution  of the
constant term is actually  even greater than the total in both cases. Furthermore, the
contributions  of educational  variables actually  have negative signs, thus implying that females
are receiving  a premium while males are penalized. Note, however, such results are
claimed the Cotton scheme produces estimated discrimination values that lie between those generated by adopting
the female and male wage structure as weight.
19dependent  on the choice of dummy  variables  in our model: following  standard  procedure we
have omitted from the regression  the group of people with the lowest level of education.
Therefore, our results suggest that for higher educational  levels, females  receive a (small)
premium and males a discount. At the same time, the difference  between the male/female
intercept  coefficients  and that of ,B*  is also generated  by a difference  in the returns to education
for individuals  with primary or less education. This would  suggest  a high level of
discrimination  may take place among  the lowest  educated  individuals. To further substantiate
this inference  we have rerun the models  omitting the highest  educational  group from the
regression  and included  the least educated  people among  the educational  variables over which
the decomposition  is performed. The results obtained  confirm  our intuition: the male
advantage  component  of the educational  variables  now becomes  equal to .174 and the female
disadvantage  for education  equal to .157, while the difference  in the constant  terms drops
considerably  to .106 and to .172, respectively.
In urban areas the results obtained  are qualitatively  similar. The role of the constant
terms is quite high, while education  and experience  variables have either a negative  or almost
nonexistent  contribution  to the computation  of the male advantage  and female  disadvantage.
As above, we have rerun the model  with the different set of educational  dummies, and once
again the results confirm the presence  of discrimination  mostly  at the low education  level: the
new values of the decomposition  for education  in this case are .056 for the male advantage  and
.038 for the female  disadvantage. The constant  terms drop to .038 and .057, respectively.
It is also worth noting that we have not included  in our regression  any industry specific
dummies  due to the well-known  problem of potential  endogeneity  that such variables  may
20generate. 23 Nevertheless  several studies  (OECD, 1995, 1996; World Bank, 1992)  have
emphasized  the prevalence of women in industries  and sectors, such as education  and health,
that pay lower then average salaries, while the opposite  is true for sectors  like construction  and
mining where men are predominant.  Thus, in our results, the difference  in the constant terms
may also capture an industry specific  premium that, given the male/female  distribution  across
industries, accrues mostly  to men.
V. DISCUSSION  AND CONCLUSION
Our study of Romania  represents  one of the first attempts to shed light on the
determination  of wages since the onset of the transition  to a market economy. With the aid of
comprehensive  microdata  we have been able to investigate  the structure  of labor earnings and
gender discrimination  both in rural and urban settings.
The relevance  of human capital  in the determination  of wage offers is clearly  indicated
by our results: increasing  returns to education  and to experience  are consistently  significant,
for males and females  in urban and rural areas.  Furthermore, education  returns in rural areas,
particularly  for females, are greater than for those  in urban ones.  Regional  segmentation  of
labor markets  is also evident in Romania. Such heterogeneity  is likely the result of both
econornic  history, and more specifically,  the spatial allocation  of resources during the centrally
planned system. However, it is only with economic  liberalization  that the specialization  of
specific  regions translated  into differences  in regional  performance  and consequently  in the
23 Moreover  if one is willing to make the assumption of exogeneity of the industry variables and thus include them
in the regression, then a missing variable problem arises for the non-working individuals.
21economic  situation  of local communities  (OECD, 1995). Whether market forces alone will
redistribute  resources across regions in a more or less even way represents  an interesting
question  for future study.
With regard to wage discrimination,  we have clarified the conceptual  and
methodological  shortcomings  found in previous  studies,  demonstrating  the correct application
of estimation  techniques. Our results highlight  the higher incidence  of discriminatory  practices
in rural areas; also our decomposition  of the wage gap into its fundamental  components  reveals
an occurrence  of discriminatory  behavior mainly  at low levels of education,  while experience
seems  to actually overcompensate  women. As we have seen, females  in Romania have, on
average, lower educational  attainment  then men. Given that the process of adjustment  of
wages  to market forces is not yet complete  in Romania  (Kallai and Traistaru 1998), and in light
of the increasing  difficulties  faced by less skilled  workers elsewhere  in the region (Orazem  and
Vodopivec 1998),  we might expect a decrease  in the female  relative wage as the transition
process continues.
Furthermore, we have inferred that our findings  may also capture discrimination  that
leads to high levels of heterogeneity  in participation  rates across  genders  in different sectors  of
the economy. The anecdotal  evidence  of the presence  of discriminatory  behavior in sector
specific  hiring as well as firing practices  is actually  overwhelming  throughout  all of Eastern
Europe. More research is thus needed  to specifically  model  potential  discrimination  in the
determination  of the occupation  or sector of employment. As we have discussed,  the inclusion
of occupation  or sector dummies  in wage estimation  poses well known  endogeneity  problems,
and explains why we, and others, have concentrated  on the examination  of the wage gap across
genders. Modeling  discrimination  practices that may influence  labor market participation  per
22se, rather than wage differentials,  would  therefore  be a useful contribution  if the endogeneity
problerns  could be overcome. 24
24  A first attempt in this direction is offered by Appleton et al (1999). Analogous to the methodology used for
wages, they first estimate the participation choice independently for men and women and then obtain the non-
discriminatory  structure by applying the same weighting matrix n used, as in this paper, for the wage model.
While this represents an interesting attempt, it is not proven that, as shown by Newmark (1988) for the analysis of
wage discrimination,  this is the appropriate weighting scheme for the participation model as well.
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25TABLE  1
Means  and Standard  Deviations  of  Variables
Females  Males
Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban
Mean  Dev.  Mean  Dev.  Mean  Dev.  Mean  Dev.
Age(%)
15-25  0.2121  0.4088  0.1581  0.3649  0.2429  0.4289  0.1684  0.3743
26-35  0.1594  0.3661  0.2491  0.4325  0.1764  0.3812  0.2183  0.4131
36-45  0.1949  0.3962  0.2964  0.4567  0.1810  0.3851  0.3000  0.4583
46-55  0.2071  0.4052  0.1661  0.3722  0.1823  0.3861  0.1748  0.3798
56-65  0.2265  0.4186  0.1302  0.3366  0.2173  0.4124  0.1384  0.3454
Educ.  Level Compl.  (%)
None  0.0456  0.2086  0.0155  0.1237  0.0194  0.1379  0.0068  0.0822
Primary  0.2572  0.4371  0.0743  0.2623  0.1708  0.3764  0.0458  0.2091
Secondary 1  0.3889  0.4875  0.2406  0.4275  0.3435  0.4749  0.1598  0.3664
Secondary 11  0.2872  0.4525  0.5136  0.4998  0.4246  0.4943  0.5444  0.4981
Prof & Tech.  0.0101  0.1002  0.0602  0.2379  0.0233  0.1509  0.1026  0.3035
University I  0.0046  0.0675  0.0131  0.1137  0.0039  0.0625  0.0218  0.1462
University II  0.0065  0.0802  0.0827  0.2754  0.0144  0.1192  0.1187  0.3235
No. Chfldren
0-1  0.1017  0.3167  0.0711  0.2721  0.0922  0.3041  0.0707  0.2696
1 - 5  0.2264  0.5039  0.1935  0.4570  0.2073  0.4878  0.1915  0.4546
6 - 14  0.5240  0.9066  0.5733  0.8556  0.5026  0.8850  0.5668  0.8584
No. Adults
Females 25-65  1.4243  0.8404  1.2477  0.7365  1.7817  0.8862  1.5272  0.7549
Males 15-65  1.5549  0.7287  1.4735  0.7041  1.3624  0.7022  1.3272  0.6482
Elderly  >65  0.2035  0.4548  0.0947  0.3212  0.1735  0.4463  0.0674  0.2789
Married(%)  0.7781  0.4155  0.7777  0.4158  0.6910  0.4621  0.7939  0.4045
Land  (ha.)
26Plough Orch. Vin.  1.2599  1.5973  0.1142  0.6108  1.2345  1.5696  0.1150  0.6035
Pasture Hay  0.2612  0.6630  0.0259  0.3339  0.2677  0.6851  0.0276  0.3403
Ethnicity  (%)
Romanian  0.9159  0.2775  0.8999  0.3002  0.9113  0.2844  0.8988  0.3016
Hungarian  0.0627  0.2424  0.0761  0.2652  0.0659  0.2481  0.0749  0.2632
German  0.0017  0.0411  0.0036  0.0602  0.0020  0.0447  0.0057  0.0755
Gypsy  0.0106  0.1026  0.0132  0.1141  0.0099  0.0992  0,0127  0.1121
Other  0.0091  0.0947  0.0072  0.0845  0.0109  0.1038  0.0079  0.0883
Regions  (%)
Marramures  0.0662  0.2486  0.0506  0.2191  0.0673  0.2506  0.0484  0.2147
Cristiana-Banat  0.0935  0.2912  0.0852  0.2792  0.0893  0.2852  0.0839  0.2772
Transylvania  0.1581  0.3649  0.2261  0.4183  0.1628  0.3692  0.2303  0.4210
Oltenia  0.1391  0.3461  0.0897  0.2857  0.1376  0.3445  0.0905  0.2869
Muntenia  0.2398  0.4270  0.1624  0.3688  0.2315  0.4218  0.1643  0.3705
Dobrogea  0.0348  0.1833  0.0551  0.2282  0.0351  0.1839  0.0549  0.2277
Moldavia  0.2417  0.4281  0.1703  0.3759  0.2503  0.4332  0.1743  0.3794
R/U Bucharest  0.0268  0.1614  0.1607  0.3673  0.0262  0.1597  0.1535  0.3605
Log real obs. wage  6.3922  0.4944  6.5943  0.4875  6.5598  0.4835  6.8132  0.4966
Hours wcirked/month  164.22  34.00  163,76  31.69  172.70  32.90  168.41  31.28
Pot. experience (years)  20.00  10.85  20.14  9.45  22.30  12.28  20.11  10.15
# of wage workers  1711  5751  4299  6685
Total obs.  10050  10997  10468  10300
27TABLE 2
Wage Equations (Dependent Variable: Log of Gross Hourly Wages)
Rural  Urban
Variable  Males  Females  Males  Females
Education  dummies  Secondary  0.106 ***  0.344  ***  0.089  ***  0.133
(rel.  to primary  or  less)  0.025  0.061  0.020  0.025
Prof.  & Techn.  0.275  ***  0.594  ***  0.238  ***  0.229
0.047  0.111  0.029  0.038
University  0.431  ***  0.871 ***  0.440  ***  0.583
0.052  0.119  0.028  0.041
ExperienceX  102 Experience  0.940  **  2.117  *  1.141  ***  2.159
0.386  0.655  0.275  0.348
Experience  sq.  -1.759  ***  -4.573  ***  -2.797  ***  -4.680
0.678  1.291  0.550  0.727
Age dummies  26-35  0.052  *  0.096  *  0.087  ***  0.026
(rel.  to 15-25)  0.031  0.050  0.028  0.033
36-45  0.047  0.184  **  0.109  ***  0.084
0.043  0.074  0.033  0.044
46-55  0.066  0.262  *  0.165 *  0.158
0.048  0.079  0.038  0.045
56-65  0.180  ***  0.266  *  0.217  ***  0.107
0.066  0.149  0.058  0.096
Region dummies  Cristiana-Banat  -0.033  -0.044  -0.093  ***  -0.084
(rel.  to Marramures)  0.037  0.066  0.032  0.032
Transylvania  -0.115  ***  -0.072  -0.085  ***  -0.039
0.033  0.060  0.028  0.028
Oltenia  -0.015  -0.088  -0.085  ***  -0.120
0.035  0.061  0.032  0.032
Muntenia  -0.077  **  -0.036  -0.131  ***  -0.088
0.033  0.058  0.029  0.030
28Dobrogea  -0.130  ***  -0.045  -0.074 **  -0.042
0.046  0.080  0.035  0.038
Moldavia  -0.123  ***  -0.261  ***  -0.129  ***  -0.124
0.034  0.060  0.029  0.030
Bucharest  -0.170  ***  -0.084  -0.086  ***  -0.072
0.049  0.079  0.030  0.029
EtInicity  dummies  Hungarian  -0.080  **  -0.025  -0.069  ***  -0.014
(rel.  to Romanian)  0.033  0.049  0.025  0.025
Other  0.102 *  0.025  -0.164  ***  -0.078
0.062  0.110  0.046  0.061
Land  X 10'  Plou+Viny+Orch  -0.129 ***  -0.116  -0.344  ***  0.031
0.047  0.081  0.114  0.120
Pasture  +  Hay  0.005  -0.094  1.140 ***  -0.141
0.135  0.233  0.215  0.392
Marriage  dummy  Married  Yes =  1  0.068 **  0.008  0.151  ***  0.034
0.028  0.030  0.025  0.015
Intercept  6.425  ***  5.706  ***  6.448 ***  6.209
0.082  0.167  0.064  0.080
Sigma  0.465 ***  0.476  ***  0.456  0.442
0.007  0.020  0.004  0.005
Rho  -0.165  0.356 **  -0.068  -0.062
0.103  0.144  0.093  0.129
Log Likelihood  -8287.2  -4563.1  -9286  -9339.9
No. of observations  10468  10050  10300  10997
Notes: Standard errors in italics.  Significance levels: a)* 10% level, b)** 5% level, c) *** 1% level.
29TABLE 3
Marginal Returns to Education
Rural  Urban
Males  Females  Males  Females
Secondary  0.111  0.410  0.093  0.142
Prof & Techn  0.184  0.284  0.160  0.100
University  0.168  0.319  0.223  0.424
30TABLE 4
Wage Discrimination in Urban Areas
Offered Wage Diff  Discrimin.  Male Adv.  Fem. Disv.  Product. Diff
Ln(G,.f+l)=.244  In(D,,f+l)  In (d,,,,+l1)  In  (deg+ )  In (Q,,g +1)
Q=(X'X)-t Xm'Xm  0.193  0.100  0.093  0.051
Education  -0.045  0.001  0.040
Experience  -0.019  -0.082  0.007
Constant  0.140  0.097  0.000
0=I  (male)  0.205  - 0.205  0.040
Education  - -0.035  0.032
Experience  - -0.100  0.005
Constant  - 0.238  0.000
Q=0  (female)  0.198  0.198  - 0.046
Education  -0.042  - 0.039
Experience  -0.1  - 0.005
Constant  0.238  - 0.000
n= lm, 1  0.201  0.102  0.099  0.043
Education  -0.022  -0.0171  0.036
Experience  -0.051  -0.048  0.005
Constant  0.123  0.115  0.000
31TABLE 5
Wage Discrimination in Rural Areas
Offered Wage Diff.  Discrimin.  Male Adv.  Fem. Disv.  Product. Diff.
Ln(G,+  1) =.598  ln(D^,+l)  In(d. +1)  In(d4+1)  InfQ,+  1)
0=(X'X)  'Xm'Xm  0.541  0.265  0.276  0.057
Education  -0.092  -0.015  0.052
Expezience  0.001  -0.044  0.013
Constant  0.373  0.345  0.000
Q=I  (male)  0.585  - 0.585  0.013
Education  - -0.076  0.021
Experience  - -0.03  0.001
Constant  - 0.718  0.000
QS=0 (female)  0.537  0.537  - 0.061
Education  -0.116  - 0.061
Experience  -0.041  - 0.012
Constant  0.718  - 0.000
52= 1] I  0.561  0.263  0.298  0.036
Education  -0.057  -0.039  0.040
Experience  -0.020  -0.015  0.006
Constant  0.351  0.366  0.000
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